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JUSTICES AS ECONOMIC FIXERS: A 




WILLIAM P. MARSHALL††† 
INTRODUCTION 
In Economic Trends and Judicial Outcomes: A Macrotheory of 
the Court (Economic Trends),1 Professors Thomas Brennan, Lee 
Epstein, and Nancy Staudt advance a new theory of judicial 
decisionmaking. They posit that Justices respond like voters to 
economic conditions. In the typical recession, Justices punish bad 
economic policy by deferring less to the government. In the typical 
boom, Justices do the opposite; they reward the government for good 
policymaking by granting more deference. The shifting nature of 
deference impacts the government’s win rate before the Supreme 
Court. All else equal, in a normal recession the government is more 
likely to lose. In a normal boom, the government is more likely to 
win.2 
The authors refine their theory so that the size of the business 
cycle matters. When the recession is dramatic, Justices do not blame it 
on policy shortcomings. A large recession results from unexpected 
shocks, rather than misfiring government policies. And so, Justices 
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 1. Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial 
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 1219. 
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rally around the flag and grant the government more deference 
during unexpected economic events.3  
Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt look for evidence to 
support their theory by examining two pockets of tax cases. The first 
set involves cases filed between 1912 and 1929, a time period when 
the economy experienced several conventional business cycles. The 
second set involves cases filed during the Great Depression, 1930 to 
1940. The regression results are consistent with the theory. In the first 
set of cases, the government’s win rate positively correlates with the 
business cycle. It goes down in the recessions and up in the booms. In 
the 1930s, the reverse occurs. The win rate increases as the depression 
deepens and decreases when the economy picks up steam. 
As the authors explain, Economic Trends is part of their larger 
project on a macrotheory of judging that examines the effects of 
national and local trends on judicial decisionmaking.4 The project is 
extraordinarily creative and merits serious engagement and 
discussion. We begin that dialogue here. 
We start, however, with one caveat. In the pages that follow, we 
focus only on the authors’ conclusions regarding judicial behavior in 
typical economic upturns and downturns and do not address their 
review of court actions in times of severe economic crises. We do so 
because there is already a significant body of scholarship that suggests 
that courts behave differently in times of profound national trauma 
such as war.5 It is consistent with this literature to learn that courts 
have similar “rally around the flag” reactions in economic 
emergencies.6 The authors’ finding that typical economic cycles also 
 
 3. See id. (“In ‘atypical times,’ when the economy moves into a state of crisis, the Justices 
do not adopt the role of a disciplinarian but seek to support the government in an effort to help 
return the economy to a state of growth and stability.”). 
 4. Id. at 1191. 
 5. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (Vintage Books 2000) (1998) (examining how the courts have treated 
civil liberty issues arising in times of war from the 1860s to the 1940s); GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR 
ON TERRORISM (2004) (investigating how civil liberties are compromised in wartime); Eric L. 
Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395 (1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998)) (critiquing Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s book for downplaying the severity of rights deprivation in times of war and 
expanding upon some of Rehnquist’s examples). 
 6. The question whether emergency conditions should influence judicial decisionmaking 
has also received significant scholarly attention. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1043–45 (2004) (proposing a framework to be utilized in states 
of emergency that would prevent the “normalization of emergency conditions” whereby the 
MARSHALL BES IN FINAL2.DOC 5/5/2009  4:13:17 PM 
2009] JUSTICES AS ECONOMIC FIXERS 1629 
affect how Justices decide cases is, therefore, the more intriguing 
aspect of the analysis. 
Our Response proceeds in three Parts. Part I unpacks the 
theoretical model. The authors’ regression results are consistent with 
three different motivating models. First, it could be that the Justices, 
like voters, act reflexively. They get angry at the government in a 
recession and pleased in a boom, and they express these emotions in 
the votes they cast.7 Under this model, the Justices, like a single voter 
in a national election, do not act because they necessarily believe 
their votes will actually affect policymaking. Rather, they use their 
vote to reflect their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
government. We refer to this as the reflexive model. 
Second, it might be that the Justices are using their votes to 
generally encourage good policymaking and discourage bad 
policymaking at the margin by deferring to or rejecting the 
government position based on economic conditions. This model 
differs from the reflexive model in that the Justices are attempting to 
use their votes to actively attempt to influence government policy.8 It 
is similar to the reflexive model, however, in that the Justices’ actions 
are based on their reactions to general economic conditions and not 
on case-specific assessments as to the economic wisdom or effect of 
the particular tax provision at issue in the case before them. Simply 
stated, under this model, the Court treats the specific tax issue in the 
case as, in effect, a proxy for the government’s economic policies 
generally. The Justices assess the competence of these policies by the 
conditions observed at oral argument. We denote this as the 
untargeted-incentive model. 
Third, the model might be that the Justices assess the economic 
effects of the specific tax provision under review by examining 
economic conditions at oral argument. Then, the Justices decide 
cases, at least in part, based on these economic effects. Thus, they will 
 
judiciary creates an environment perpetually conducive to the widespread adoption of 
“oppressive measures”). 
 7. See Brennan et al., supra note 1, at 1197–98 (“Our account, thus, indicates that Justices 
act like voters during election cycles. Just as voters take cues from the economy, attributing 
good economic times to effective policymaking in the elected branches of government and 
(most) bad economic times to government incompetence, so do the Justices.”). 
 8. Id. at 1203 (“If the Justices believe that Congress and the president are shirking their 
management responsibilities for, say, political gain, and that this shirking has negatively affected 
the economy, then it is entirely rational for the Justices to punish this behavior in an effort to 
encourage policymakers to act in the best interests of the nation.”). 
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reject the government’s tax position in the case at hand if they 
perceive it to be harmful to the economy and will accept it if they 
believe it to be beneficial.9 As such, they create incentives for 
adopting tax policy that contribute to economic prosperity. We call 
this the targeted-incentive model. 
The implications of the empirical results depend on which model 
is being tested. If the Justices are expressing emotional gut reactions 
to economic conditions, as the reflexive model would have it, there 
should be a deference effect in every case with the government as a 
litigant, not just tax cases. If the Justices are trying to actually 
influence the government’s overall economic policies by how they 
rule on tax cases, as the untargeted-incentive model suggests, there 
should be some indication of that purpose in the opinions. If the 
Justices are trying to promote better policymaking in tax cases, as in 
the targeted-incentive model, then the likelihood the tax policy at 
issue will have an observable effect on the business cycle and, if so, 
the precise lag of that effect become increasingly important. 
With these three models in hand, Part II comments on the 
authors’ statistical analysis and suggests ways to potentially increase 
the robustness of the results. Part III discusses the normative 
implications of the authors’ study. We ask in that Part if the judicial 
behavior described in any or all of these models constitutes good 
judging, a healthy jurisprudence. We conclude that it does not. 
I.  THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
A. The Reflexive-Voting Model 
Under the reflexive-voting model, the Justices reflect their 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with economic conditions through the 
votes they cast in tax cases. This theory is akin to an expressive model 
of voting behavior. The chance that a single vote will turn an election 
is close to zero.10 So, the rational voters do not believe that their vote 
 
 9. Id. (“Instead, we argue that Justices may view their ability to refuse to implement 
flawed policies and programs as a way to encourage better economic management in the elected 
branches of government at the margin. More importantly, we posit that judicial refusal to 
implement perceived policy failures could work to limit possible damage to the economy, 
thereby advancing the interests of the Justices.”). 
 10. Dr. Anthony Downs wrote the seminal work on this well-known paradox of voting. See 
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); see also William H. Riker 
& Peter C. Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 25, 25 (1968) 
(“We describe a calculus of voting from which one infers that it is reasonable for those who vote 
to do so and also that it is equally reasonable for those who do not vote not to do so.”). 
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could actually be determinative in influencing policy. The voter, 
nevertheless, exercises the franchise to send a message of approval or 
frustration to the governing entities.11 And the evidence suggests that 
voters, as a whole, tend to vote to cast politicians out in a recession 
and reelect in an expansion.12 
The statistically significant results that Economic Trends 
uncovers are consistent with, and are plausibly explained by, Justices 
expressing their approval or disapproval of government through their 
voting behavior. Justices’ moods change with the economic 
conditions, and perhaps without even knowing it, they take out these 
emotions on the government. That is a potentially important take-
home point of the regressions because it is so different from the 
standard story of judicial behavior. 
As such, the reflexive-voting account stands in contrast to the 
strategic models of judicial behavior that posit far more deliberate 
judicial behavior.13 Yet it rings true. Why would Justices be immune 
 
 11. Riker & Ordeshook, supra note 10, at 28 (including “the satisfaction from affirming a 
partisan preference” among the utility benefits that a prospective voter may consider when 
determining whether to cast a solitary ballot). 
 12. See Gianluigi Galeotti & Antonio Forcina, Political Loyalties and the Economy: The 
U.S. Case, 71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 511, 516 (1989) (finding that, in times of economic turmoil, 
Democratic voters remain steadfastly loyal to their party to a greater extent than do Republican 
voters); Gerald H. Kramer, Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964, 65 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 131, 140–41 (1971) (“Economic fluctuations, in particular, are important 
influences on congressional elections, with economic upturn helping the congressional 
candidates of the incumbent party, and economic decline benefiting the opposition.”); Joseph P. 
McGarrity, Macroeconomic Conditions and Committee Re-election Rates, 124 PUB. CHOICE 453, 
472 (2005) (“[E]conomic conditions influence the probability of reelection for members on 
committees that manage the economy or provide a public good.”). But see William Levernier, 
The Effect of Relative Economic Performance on the Outcome of Gubernational Elections, 74 
PUB. CHOICE 181, 182 (1992) (finding that, in gubernatorial elections, “economic conditions 
have only a minor effect on the share of the vote received by the incumbent party”). 
 13. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE passim (1998); 
THOMAS H. HAMMOND, CHRIS W. BONNEAU & REGINALD S. SHEEHAN, STRATEGIC 
BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 65–238 (2005); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 29–31 (2008); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 97–109 (2002); Andrew F. 
Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial Dissent and 
Discretionary Review, 14 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5–6 (2006) (exploring the conditions 
under which dissenting appellate court judges become increasingly likely to “promote a case for 
review” by a supreme court); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 373–74 (1991) (finding discernible preferences 
reflected in the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation); Michael J. Gerhardt, Essay, How 
a Judge Thinks, 93 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 105, 107–09, on file with 
the Duke Law Journal); Symposium, Positive Political Theory and the Law, 15 J. CONTEMP. 
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from the pressure to release frustration at government policy during a 
recession? The model raises the some interesting questions: Are 
Justices more like knee-jerk voters or savvy strategic players, as the 
bulk of the literature suggests? Can Justices be both simultaneously? 
If reflexive voting is largely subconscious, are there other 
subconscious factors, such as latent hostility to, say, certain types of 
litigants, that also drive outcomes?14 
B. The Untargeted-Incentive Model 
The untargeted-incentive model suggests that Justices intend to 
affect overall government economic policy through tax rulings. By 
deferring to the government when times are good and not when times 
are bad, the Court can provide incentives for the adoption of more 
effective economic policies. 
Notably, this model does not suggest that the Justices consider 
the economic pros and cons of the particular tax issue before them on 
review. Rather, the model works in the aggregate. All government 
positions in tax cases are treated as bad during recessions and as good 
during upturns. Thus, in a downturn, the Court is less likely to defer 
to the government in a tax case even when the government’s position 
is economically sensible and, conversely, in an upturn the Court is 
more likely to defer to the government even when the government’s 
position is economically flawed. 
Although this behavior might seem counterproductive at one 
level, it is explicable. Because the Justices do not have the economic 
expertise to determine which government policies are economically 
sound and which are economically weak, they can only respond to 
 
LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1 (2006) (explaining how positive political theorists generate models to predict 
“the outcome of the lawmaking game”). 
 14. This point relates to work on how social background affects judicial decisionmaking. 
See, e.g., Jilda M. Aliotta, Combining Judges’ Attributes and Case Characteristics: An Alternative 
Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 JUDICATURE 277, 280 (1988) 
(exploring the distinct predictive impact of various background characteristics on judicial voting 
behavior in equal protection cases); James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, 
Judicial Hostility Towards Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a 
Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1682–85 (1999) (detailing the concerns raised by 
detractors of the “social background” approach to analyzing judges’ behavior); Tracey E. 
George, From Judge to Justice: Social Background Theory and the Supreme Court, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1333, 1349–56 (2008) (exploring the movement to analyze judicial behavior in light of the 
salient characteristics of judges’ lives present before their ascent to the bench); C. Neal Tate & 
Roger Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme 
Court Voting Behavior, 1916–88, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 460, 478 (1991) (devising “personal 
attributes models for Supreme Court justice voting behavior”). 
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economic conditions with a broad brush. Thus, if the Justices believe 
that they should “mitigate the impact of bad policy choices through 
the judicial process [so that] Congress and the president will be less 
likely to make bad economic decisions in the future,”15 it is plausible 
they would do so by reacting to economic conditions generally and 
not by calibrating their actions to the economic merits of the specific 
issue before them. 
We are skeptical, however, that even the savviest of Justices 
looking to influence macroeconomic policy would actually decide 
cases in this manner. 
First, for this punishment-reward scheme to work, government 
officials would have to know about it. Yet we are unaware of an 
opinion that references economic conditions during oral argument as 
a relevant factor in the decision. Sure, the Justices might not be 
transparent. Like an attitudinalist Justice, they might not want to be 
seen as deciding a case based on anything other than the “law.”16 But 
unlike Justices seeking to impose their policy preferences, Justices 
hoping to alter government policymaking would not want to hide 
their pleasure or disappointment with the government. Instead, 
Justices hoping to alter government policymaking would want the 
government to know that they were going to lose during a recession 
and win during a boom so the government could remedy its actions 
accordingly. And, presumably, those Justices would indicate as much 
in the opinion. 
Second, a Justice’s belief that shifting levels of deference in tax 
cases would, in fact, induce government officials to engage in better 
overall economic policymaking is unrealistic. There are far more 
powerful political pressures placed on elected officials than decisions 
of the Supreme Court. The fact that government officials are more 
likely to be reelected in a boom and ousted during a recession is a 
powerful incentive for those officials to try to improve the economy. 
Additionally, tax revenues go up in booms and down in recessions, 
meaning government officials have more resources to devote to 
favored policy initiatives in times of economic prosperity. Simply put, 
regardless of what the Court does, government officials will want to 
dampen a recession and prolong a boom.17 
 
 15. Brennan et al., supra note 1, at 1201. 
 16. POSNER, supra note 13, at 252–53. 
 17. The model also treats the government as a single actor. The same entity that litigates 
conducts the macroeconomic policymaking. It is not clear why, for example, the Federal 
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Third, a Justice’s decision to level untargeted incentives against 
the government must be made on the margin. The elected officials’ 
behavior is already subject to strong incentives. The question for the 
Justice is what additional motivation will shifting deference bring. 
The marginal benefit in terms of better policy is likely to be small. If 
such actions have any cost, the rational Justice would not do it. And 
there could be costs. 
For one, such a move might provoke a public backlash against 
the Court, with the political actors asserting that the Court is deciding 
cases on illegitimate grounds. The executive might argue that the 
Court is meddling in macroeconomic policymaking and, as such, 
extending its influence too far. 
A second cost to a Justice involves the sacrifice of other values. 
Take a Justice who harbors a policy preference: she prefers tax policy 
that favors the poor.18 The same Justice cares about better economic 
policymaking. A case comes before the Court in a recession. Suppose 
that to satisfy her preference for the poor, the Justice would want to 
rule in favor of the government. To motivate better overall economic 
policymaking, however, the Justice would want to rule against the 
government. The cost to creating untargeted incentives is forgoing the 
chance to help poor people. This sacrifice will not be worthwhile if 
the untargeted incentives fail to provide much in the way of 
incentives for better policymaking. 
C. The Targeted-Incentive Model 
The targeted-incentive model posits that the Justices take 
economic success or failure into account when they adjudicate tax 
issues. Justices lack economic expertise. Therefore, they use the 
conditions at oral argument as a rough proxy for whether a tax policy 
had a good or bad effect. Under this model, the Court defers to the 
government’s tax positions that have beneficial economic 
consequences and does not defer to the government when the latter’s 
position is economically detrimental. 
 
Reserve chair would care or know about shifting deference in tax cases before the Supreme 
Court. If the chair does not care, it is unclear why the deference scheme would alter decisions 
regarding monetary policy. 
 18. The question of whether a judge should decide cases based on policy preferences is 
another matter. Our point here is that only deciding cases based on economic conditions may 
interfere with a judge’s own jurisprudential approach. 
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Certainly this is a plausible account of judicial decisionmaking. 
Justices regularly take broad consequences into consideration when 
deciding cases. And they might be particularly attuned to the 
economic implications of their decisions when cases come before 
them during economic upturns or downturns. Further, the fact that 
the Court rejects the government’s position more frequently in times 
of recessions than in times of boom may reflect that the bad economic 
consequences of particular government positions may be more 
apparent during downtimes than in upturns. 
Nevertheless, we are unsure if this model explains the authors’ 
findings. First, the study reviews all tax cases, not just cases in which a 
Justice could reasonably assume that the tax question at issue would 
have any economic impact whatsoever, much less be a contributing 
factor to the business cycle. The Court’s decision in United States v. 
Shelley,19 for example, which held that mixing smoking opium with the 
residue of opium that had been smoked should not be treated as the 
manufacture of opium under the tax laws, does not address a matter 
of broad economic import.20 Similarly, the question addressed in 
United States v. Whitridge,21 whether or not receivership income 
should be subject to the corporate income tax,22 is unlikely to have 
significant and observable effects on economic upturns or downturns. 
Therefore, it is difficult to see how the Court’s decisions ruling against 
the government in cases like Shelley and Whitridge, in which the tax 
issues in question are relatively insular, could be seen as an effort to 
refuse “to implement perceived policy failures [so as to] to limit 
possible damage to the economy.”23 Why would a rational Justice use 
a business cycle proxy to assess the success or failure of the 
government’s positions at issue in Shelley and Whitridge? 
Second, the study itself does not code between economically 
sound and economically flawed governmental positions in the tax 
cases collected. Instead, it posits that Justices think a tax policy is 
flawed if, at oral argument, the economy is in recession, and they 
think a tax policy is economically sound if, at oral argument, the 
economy is in a boom. Indeed the major insight of Economic Trends 
 
 19. United States v. Shelley, 229 U.S. 239 (1913). 
 20. Brennan et al., supra note 1, at 1209–10 (indicating that the authors compiled their 
dataset by conducting a Lexis search on the word “tax” for cases decided between 1913 and 
1940 and retained cases that involved the Justices’ interpretation of a tax statute). 
 21. United States v. Whitridge, 231 U.S. 144 (1913). 
 22. Id. at 149. 
 23. Brennan et al., supra note 1, at 1203. 
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is that the Court’s decisions in tax cases are broadly based reactions 
to economic conditions and not finely calibrated responses to 
particular governmental initiatives. 
As such, however, the targeted-incentive model raises many of 
the same problems as the untargeted-incentive model. After all, if the 
Court has never said it would assess the strength of a tax case by 
reference to economic conditions at oral argument, it is difficult to 
believe that it would use that indicia to achieve its presumed targeting 
goals. Even assuming that (1) the government could be motivated to 
make better tax policy by shifting Court deference and (2) better 
policymaking in certain tax cases would ultimately show up in the 
business cycle, those results cannot accrue unless the government 
knows about the incentive scheme. Accordingly, if the Justices 
wanted to provide these incentives they would have to have said so in 
the opinions. 
Third, as will be discussed in the next Part, the targeted-incentive 
model raises timing problems regarding the case samples in the 
study.24 If the Court is looking at the economic effect of a tax 
provision, it is not clear that it would be concerned with the economic 
conditions at the time of oral argument rather than the economic 
conditions surrounding the time the position was adopted. 
II.  THOUGHTS ON STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY 
The statistical analysis in Economic Trends is carefully 
constructed and the authors should be commended for their skill and 
creativity in compiling their results and for their refreshing candor in 
acknowledging the limitations of the data. We do, however, in this 
Part, suggest two areas in which the robustness of the statistical 
results might be improved. First, Part II.A considers issues of timing 
and case selection in the sample. The authors focus on economic 
conditions at the time of oral argument in coding the sampled cases, 
but to us, it makes a significant difference as to which theoretical 
model the authors are testing for that time to be the relevant factor. 
Second, Part II.B discusses the unrelated selection bias problem 
identified by the authors: the idea that the cases litigated before the 
Supreme Court in times of economic booms might not have the same 
characteristics as cases litigated before the Court in time of economic 
 
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
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busts. In that Section we suggest some alternative ways to deal with 
this issue. 
A. Timing Issues 
Economic Trends posits that the economic conditions on the date 
of oral argument trigger the Court’s response. The authors’ choice of 
oral argument as the key date for measuring economic conditions 
makes sense under the reflexive and untargeted-incentive models. 
There, the Court does not specifically consider the economic policy 
implications of the tax issue before it. The Court simply rewards or 
penalizes the government irrespective of the actual policies at issue in 
the case.25 
The authors’ choice of oral argument as the appropriate date to 
measure economic conditions does not as readily comport with the 
targeted-incentive model, however. Assume that the there is an 
economic downturn at oral argument. The authors’ theory posits that 
the Court would be less likely to defer to the government because the 
Court would assume that the fact there was an economic downturn at 
the time of oral argument meant that the government’s policy had a 
bad economic effect. 
One concern with this analysis is that it assumes the Justices 
would ignore whether the policy at issue actually helped precipitate 
the economic downturn. It may be, for example, that the government 
made its taxation decision during an uptick in the economy and its 
impact on the business cycle, if any, enhanced the existing boom. In 
that case, the Justices should be granting the government more 
deference (the policy worked, after all), even though after working its 
way through the system the case ended up on the docket during a 
recession. 
The targeted-incentive model thus presumes two propositions. 
First, as noted above, it assumes that the tax policy at issue had an 
economic effect which would show up in the business cycle. Second, it 
 
 25. The only difference between the reflexive and untargeted-incentive models in this 
respect is that whereas under the reflexive model the Court’s action simply expresses a message 
of approval or disapproval, the Court’s action under the untargeted incentive is to encourage 
the government to engage in better policymaking across the board. The expressive model has 
consequences, of course. Litigants win or lose; the law is changed. Under the expressive model, 
the Justices do not anticipate that these consequences will impact overall macroeconomic 
policy. 
MARSHALL BES IN FINAL2.DOC 5/5/2009  4:13:17 PM 
1638 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1627 
assumes that the lag in the economic effect coincides with the date of 
oral argument. 
Consider again United States v. Whitridge. As noted, the issue in 
Whitridge was whether receivership income was subject to the 
corporate income tax.26 In 1908, the assets of a few distressed street 
railways in New York City had been placed in receivership. The 
receiver’s job, as articulated by the appointing court, was “to run, 
manage, and operate said railroads and properties, to collect the 
rents, income, tolls, issues, and profits of said railroad and property, 
to exercise the authority and franchises of said defendant, and 
discharge its public duties.”27 The case was consolidated with a second 
distressed railway case.28 In 1911, the government filed a petition 
demanding that the receivers declare the net income of the railway 
corporations as income for corporation tax law purposes.29 The 
receivers balked, claiming they managed the assets as officers of the 
court,30 not as the directors and officers of the corporations.31 In 1912, 
the district court ruled for the receivers. The court of appeals 
affirmed, and the government appealed to the Supreme Court. 
The Court heard oral argument on October 21, 1913 and ruled 
against the government on November 10, 1913.32 
In evaluating the economic impact of the decision to tax 
receivership income, the relevant macroeconomic data are likely to 
be what was happening in 1911, shortly after the decision was made, 
not what was happening at oral argument in 1913. Moreover, in 1912, 
the lower court invalidated the taxation decision, dampening, if not 
eliminating, any economic effects of that initial decision that might be 
felt in 1913. 
Even in cases where the lower court upholds the government’s 
tax decision, the only way the assumption of the oral argument 
marker makes sense is if the lag in the effect of the taxation decision 
tracks the time it takes for the case to reach the oral argument stage 
at the U.S. Supreme Court. But why would this be so? 
 
 26. Whitridge, 231 U.S. at 144. 
 27. Id. at 146. 
 28. Id. at 145. 
 29. Id. at 146. 
 30. Id. at 147. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 144. 
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All this is to say that timing can be important. One coding 
question then leaps to mind: are economic conditions at oral 
argument the relevant markers for determining whether the Court is, 
in fact, actually reacting to the economic impact of the government’s 
tax decisions in deciding tax cases? 
B. Selection Effects 
In normal times the data reveal a positive correlation between 
economic conditions and government win rates. For the data to be 
consistent with any of the models, the only difference between a 
boom and bust must be the Justices’ perception of the government as 
a litigant. The theory requires that the Justices consider the same 
cases independent of the economic climate. The cases must have the 
same merits; they must be litigated with the same vigor; and the 
settlement behavior of all affected parties must be similar. If not, the 
relationship might be the result of the appeal of different cases, rather 
than the same type of cases being adjudicated differently. The 
government, for example, might bring more legally questionable tax 
cases in a recession because it needs the revenue. Or the government 
might devote fewer resources to litigating cases in a recession because 
of a tighter budget constraint. Either way, the relationship between 
win rates and the trough of the business cycle reflects something 
special about the cases the Court considered at that time, rather than 
the punishment of bad policymaking or knee-jerk expressive 
reactions. Disentangling the two explanations is dicey.33 The authors 
assume that selection effects are not driving the results.34 As 
commentators, we wanted to offer some constructive suggestions for 
checking the validity of this assumption. 
To tease out the effects, the authors first might consider 
unexpected shocks to output. By definition, litigants cannot anticipate 
an unexpected shock. As a result, unexpected changes in economic 
conditions should not change the kinds of tax cases the government 
appeals. But the Court’s perception of those cases will change. The 
Court observes the unexpected shock and then decides whether to 
punish or not. A relationship between win rates and unexpected 
 
 33. For a discussion of the statistical consequences of selection bias, see WILLIAM H. 
GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 926–34 (4th ed. 2000). 
 34. Brennan et al., supra note 1, at 1194–95 (describing the authors’ theory that Justices 
respond to economic prosperity or downturns by expressing support or disapproval for 
government management, but not addressing selection effects). 
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shocks would suggest that the Justices’ perceptions—rather than 
differing attributes of the cases being reviewed—are the driving 
factor. 
The literature on economic forecasting is massive and 
sophisticated.35 We do not delve into the details here. One simple way 
to uncover unexpected changes in output is this: use the simplest 
forecasting model.36 Suppose that industrial production in period t is a 
linear function of industrial productions in the prior periods. 
Compare the forecasted industrial production in period t with the 
actual industrial production in period t. The difference is one measure 
of the unexpected change in production that period. The authors 
might then regress the unexpected change in output occurring on or 
around the date of oral argument against the government win rates 
and see what happens. 
Alternatively, the authors might consider using changes in 
industrial production between the grant of certiorari and the oral 
argument as the core variable. The Court normally grants certiorari a 
few months before oral argument. After certiorari has been granted, 
the appeal has already happened. And so, the concern that the 
government pursues legally suspect cases in a recession and slam 
dunk cases in a boom dissipates. The only thing changing is the 
economic condition between the certiorari date and the oral 
argument. 
This second approach is not a perfect fix, however. The 
government might litigate the same case differently depending on the 
economic climate, especially if the budget impacts the resources the 
government can devote to pursuing appeals. 
III.  JUSTICES AS ECONOMIC FIXERS 
Economic Trends describes judicial behavior; it does not critique 
it. But the normative aspects of the judicial behavior depicted are as 
intriguing as the behavior itself. We therefore offer some preliminary 
observations on this issue. 
Our reaction, of course, depends in large measure on the nature 
of the judicial behavior one thinks the study depicts. If the implication 
 
 35. For an overview on economic forecasting, see generally PETER ABELSON & ROSELYNE 
JOYEUX, ECONOMIC FORECASTING (2000); NICOLAS CARNOT, VINCENT KOEN & BRUNO 
TISSOT, ECONOMIC FORECASTING (2005). 
 36. On this simple model, see JAMES D. HAMILTON, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 72–77 (1994). 
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of the study is that Justices subconsciously take economic conditions 
into account when deciding cases, then the Justices can be criticized 
for not being appropriately self-aware to correct against their 
intuitions.37 Indeed, if subconscious behavior explains the results 
captured in Economic Trends, one of the article’s most significant 
contributions is that it will alert sitting judges to be aware of and 
guard against such reactions in future cases.38 
If the claim, however, is that Justices intentionally rule for or 
against the government in tax cases based on economic conditions 
unrelated to the legal merits of the case, the normative implications of 
the study are far more serious. Consider the untargeted-incentive 
model. Although, under this model, the Justices may be acting with 
an understandable desire to encourage the government to improve 
the economy, it is troublesome to think that they would do so by 
deciding cases based on economic conditions unrelated to the merits 
of the legal issue before them. They have no constitutional authority 
to act in this manner. Courts, after all, decide cases, not economic 
policy. Indeed, if, as the Supreme Court has explained, “courts are 
not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of 
the Nation’s laws,”39 they can hardly be considered roving 
commissions assigned to pass judgment on the Nation’s economy. 
The judicial behavior described in both the untargeted-incentive 
and reflexive models is also problematic for other reasons. First, the 
public’s faith in the Supreme Court (or any court for that matter) 
depends on a consistent application of law to facts. Consequently, if 
Justices deliberately choose not to decide like cases alike simply 
because of extraneous economic conditions, they risk violating that 
faith and damaging their own credibility. Justices, like voters, may 
react to economic conditions, but they are not empowered to make 
 
 37. There is a growing body of literature on debiasing judges and the relative strengths of 
various debiasing strategies, though this literature generally focuses on addressing the effects of 
cognitive biases. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 199 passim (2006); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of 
Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 586–88 (1998); Neil D. Weinstein & William M. 
Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, in HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 313, 313–23 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). A groundbreaking work in this field was Baruch 
Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 422, 422–
44 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
 38. One judge on the panel at the Symposium praised the study for this exact reason. 
 39. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610–11 (1973) (discussing why the 
application of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine should be limited). 
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judicial decisions based on those factors. In a world of judicial review 
and life tenure, it is unsettling that Justices would choose the outcome 
based on a knee-jerk response to economic conditions, rather than a 
careful consideration of the consequences of alternative rulings 
specific to that case. (This is not to say that such judicial behavior 
does not occur. Justice Douglas, for example, was seriously criticized 
for reflexively voting against the government in tax cases because of 
his purported dislike of the Internal Revenue Service.)40 
Second, the untargeted-incentive and reflexive-voting models 
lead to instability in the law, which poses significant costs. Parties lose 
the ability to structure their transactions when the law lacks 
predictability, which would be the case if legal interpretation was tied 
to economic conditions. The lack of predictability also discourages 
settlement.41 In deciding whether to appeal a case—in candidly 
assessing the legal merits—lawyers would have to engage in economic 
forecasting, trying to pin down the likely dip or uptick in the economy 
around oral argument. Few lawyers would be able to do this 
successfully. 
Third, these models may simply lead to bad results. As we have 
seen, under both the untargeted-incentive and reflexive models, 
Justices may reject a sound governmental economic position if the 
case serendipitously happens to come before the Court in an 
economic downturn, and the Court may uphold flawed economic 
policies if those positions are reviewed in good times. The end result 
is a jumbled jurisprudence with no legal coherence because neither 
legal doctrine nor sound policy ties cases together. 
The behavior under the targeted-incentive model is normatively 
more defensible. If the Court determines that a government position 
fosters economic weakness, it can take that into consideration in 
reviewing the legality of that position. 
 
 40. See Bernard Wolfman, Jonathan L.F. Silver & Marjorie A. Silver, The Behavior of 
Justice Douglas in Federal Tax Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 270–76 (1973). 
 41. See Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of 
Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839, 1852 (2006) (“If the point of 
clear legal rules is to allow the expectations of parties to settle, then private ordering is 
compromised to the extent that imprecise legal rules defeat the needed predictability for parties 
to make informed assessments of their rights and responsibilities.”). But see Louis Kaplow, 
Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 573 n.35 (1992) (“The 
likelihood of litigation rather than settlement may also be affected [by the choice of rules versus 
standards]. Lower litigation costs make litigation more likely under rules, but the greater 
predictability of outcomes makes litigation less likely.”). On settlement, see generally George L. 
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
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But there are normative problems inherent in this model as well. 
The first is transparency. If the Court is using this model it should 
explain itself accordingly. Second, and relatedly, is lack of notice to 
the litigants. For this model to work, the litigants would need to be 
aware that economic effects will drive the Court’s decisions so they 
can brief and analyze the legal issue in question from an economic 
perspective. Moreover, because the triggering time to adjudge the 
economic viability is oral argument, the litigants would have to 
speculate as to what the economic conditions will be at oral argument 
when they first seek certiorari and then again when they write their 
merits briefs. 
Even with transparency, the effect of the Court’s choosing to 
view the economic success or failure of the government’s position by 
referencing the state of the economy at the time of oral argument 
may lead to only short-term, rather than long-term, economic gains. 
Assuming it works at all, it encourages the government to tie tax 
policy to the business cycle rather than long-term growth. Finally, 
using the timing of oral argument as the key point to proxy the 
economic success of a government position is a bad idea, especially if 
the tax policy at issue is unlikely to have played any observable role 
in the business cycle. 
CONCLUSION 
Economic Trends offers a unique and novel perspective on 
judicial behavior. The regressions are especially interesting because 
they find a significant relationship between economic conditions and 
vote outcomes. Why is that so? Assuming the statistical results are 
robust, we find the most theoretically plausible explanation to be that 
Justices subconsciously let their mood relating to the economic 
climate bleed into their decisionmaking. If this is true, the same 
deference effect should arise across many areas of law and time 
periods. We are curious whether the same sorts of effects would be 
found elsewhere and hope the study, like the first empirical tests of 
the attitudinal model, stimulate new research on these questions. 
Alternatively, the study could be read to suggest that Justices are 
intentionally attempting to use judicial power to fix economic 
conditions. If so, it suggests that Justices are acting both beyond their 
constitutional powers and their economic expertise. As such, the 
judiciary should be broadly criticized for this behavior. 
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Finally, this work represents a place where the rising barrier 
between the judiciary and the legal academy should be crossed.42 
Judges need to know about this study because it can alert them to 
their own subconscious motivations. The next time a case comes up in 
a recession, the judges can then make an affirmative effort to stifle 
their anger at government mismanagement and instead pay closer 
attention to the arguments made and the consequences of the 
decision. 
 
 42. A number of judges have articulated this concern. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, 
Reflections (On Law Review, Legal Education, Law Practice, and My Alma Mater), 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 1999, 2001 (2002) (“The most serious concern that I have with legal scholarship is that 
too much of it is useless.”); Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: Bernard D. Meltzer (1914–2007), 
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 435 (2007) (“What has happened since the 1960s . . . is the growing 
apart, especially but not only at the elite law schools, of the lawyer and the judge on the one 
hand and the law professor on the other hand.”). 
